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TAKING AIM AT AN AMERICAN MYTH
Paul Finkelman*
ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL GUN CULTURE.

By
Michael A. Bellesiles. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2000. Pp. 16, 603.
Cloth, $30; paper, $16.
Every American had a musket hanging over his fireplace at night,
and by his side during the day. Like Cincinnatus, time and again
Americans dropped their plows to shoulder their arms, to fight the In
dians, the French, the Indians, the British, the Indians, the Mexicans,
the Indians yet again, and then, from 1861 to 1865, each other. Ameri
can men were comfortable with guns; they needed them and wanted
them. They felt at home in woods, in search of food, or in defense of
their homesteads.
It is a story as old as our first pulp novels and earliest movies. It is
larger than John Wayne and as real to us as Ronald Reagan narrating
Death Valley Days. And, as Michael Bellesiles1 persuasively demon
strates, it is largely untrue.
In A rming America, Michael Bellesiles challenges - indeed, de
molishes - the pervasive notion that America was always a nation of
gun owners, gun users, and most importantly, gun lovers. While vul
nerable to some criticism,2 this is one of the most important books in
American history of the last decade. It has gathered great praise and
at least one major award, the Bancroft Prize for the best book in
American history. Bellesiles offers a full scale, and for the most part
successful, attack on one of the most persistent myths of American
culture: that throughout our early history Americans were a gun
toting people, skilled at shooting and hunting, often violent, using
their guns to defend their honor or just to settle an argument, and
* Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. B.A.
1971, Syracuse University; M.A., 1972, University of Chicago; Ph.D. 1976, University of
Chicago; Fellow in Law and Humanities, 1982-83, Harvard Law School. - Ed.

1. Professor of History, Emory University; Director, Emory Center for the Study of
Violence.
2. Most importantly, Professor James Lindgren of Northwestern University has chal
lenged Bellesiles's use and analysis of probate records. See James Lindgren & Justin Lee
Heather, Counting Guns in Early America (2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author). It is also quite likely that some of Bellesiles's other counts may not hold up. For ex
ample, he notes studies of newspapers for states or cities in which no gunsmiths advertised.
Pp. 228-29. It is possible that a study of other papers from the same city or state will find a
gunsmith here or there, but such minor details will not alter the general picture Bellesiles has
painted.
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ready at a moment's notice to grab musket and powder horn to defend
their homes and homeland.
The story Bellesiles tells is different, persuasive, and, most of all,
logical. Bellesiles makes many contributions to our understanding of
guns in early America, many of which run counter to our myths but
logically dovetail with what else we know about society. For example,
Bellesiles demonstrates that:
1) Guns, at least until the mid-nineteenth century, were expensive,
costing the equivalent of two months' wages (p. 106). Before the
1750s, few outside of the upper class could afford them. From the first
settlement until the eve of the Civil War, guns were scarce and largely
unavailable. Indeed, there was a persistent shortage of guns, even for
military purposes, from the earliest English settlements until the mid
dle of the Civil War.
2) Hunting was a time consuming, inefficient way of finding food
or making a living. While some men on the frontier hunted for a living,
they were rare and relatively unsuccessful. Most Americans on the
frontier were farmers, raising corn, hogs, and cattle. As scholars of the
European invasion of the Americas have long known, domesticated
animals and the ability to grow crops, especially wheat, were keys to
the success of Europeans on the frontier. 3 Thus, as Bellesiles notes:
If a settler wanted meat, he did not pull his trusty and rusty musket, inac
curate beyond twenty yards, off the hook above the door and spend the
day cleaning and preparing it. . . . To head off into the woods for two
days in order to drag the carcass of a deer back to his family - assuming
he was lucky enough to find one, not to mention to kill it - would have
struck any American of the Colonial period as supreme lunacy. Far eas
ier to sharpen the ax and chop off the head of a chicken or, as they all did
in regular communal get-togethers, slaughter one of their enormous

[p. 103]
Even on the overland trail, hunting was time consuming and po
tentially dangerous. People who spent time hunting might not make it
across the great plains in time to miss winter (pp. 341-42).
3) Americans had notoriously poor skills with weapons, and most
did not know how to handle guns. Guns. were complicated and difficult
to maintain. Many fell into disrepair, became rusty, and were mostly
useless. Almost every account of military recruiting and militia mus
ters - from the earliest colonial records through the beginning of the
Civil War - describes vast numbers of American men who never held
a gun, had no idea how to shoot one, and most importantly, had no in
terest in learning.
hogs, salting down the meat to last months.

3. See, e.g., AL CROSBY, GERMS, SEEDS AND ANIMALS: STUDIES IN ECOLOGICAL
HISTORY (1994); AL CROSBY, THE COLUMBIAN EXCHANGE: BIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL
CONSEQUENCES OF 1492 (1977).
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4) The American militia was almost universally incompetent, and
with a few notable exceptions, in all of America's wars the militia was
rarely successful in battle. During the colonial wars, the Revolution,
and the Civil War, Americans had to be trained not only to march and
dig fortifications, but also to load and fire guns. Contrary to our
popular myths, the American Revolution was not won by the militias,
although clearly in a few important battles the militias were heroic,
competent, and successful. Rather, the war was won by the national
army, trained for the most part by professional soldiers from Europe,
like Baron von Steuben, Tadeusz Koscuiszko, and the Marquis de
Lafayette.4
5) Before the Civil War, guns were extremely complicated tools,
requiring practice and skill to load and fire. A small miscalculation in
the amount of powder placed in a gun could tum it into a harmless
noisemaker or, just as easily, into a dangerous exploding device more
likely to injure the one holding the gun than anyone else.
6) Bellesiles demonstrates that gun ownership did not become
common until after the Civil War. The reason is largely economic and
technological. During the war the United States rapidly and success
fully expanded its production of weapons, developing new manufac
turing technologies and new kinds of weapons. The end of the war left
the nation with a surplus of guns and, just as significantly, a number of
companies that faced bankruptcy if they did not find a new market for
their product. Thus, advertising, entrepreneurship, and economies of
scale led to the arming of America after the Civil War (p. 431). Tied to
this development was the existence of millions of veterans now skilled
in the use of guns, and thus able safely to handle them (pp. 428-29).
These are just some of the basics Bellesiles teaches as he forces us
to unlearn our myth and to relearn American history.
For legal scholars, Bellesiles teaches a vital story that helps explain
both our modern gun culture and the origin of the Second Amend
ment. The story shows that the personal ownership of weapons was
not a central aspect of early American society and that, for the most
part, guns were regulated. In addition, Bellesiles shows that while the
militias of early America were for the most part underarmed, under
trained, and relatively ii:icompetent, the image of the militia was a cen
tral myth in the development of the nation. At the end of the Revolu
tion, Americans knew that "Republican ideology had not won the
Revolution. The militia, Jefferson's repository of courage and virtue
had not come through in times of ultimate crisis; the Continental
army, the professional soldiers, had" (p. 207). But Americans desper4. Thus, at Valley Forge, Washington worked with von Steuben to train the American
soldiers to be more like European professionals, and to drill them so they would look less
and less like militiamen. JOHN SHY, A PEOPLE NUMEROUS AND ARMED: REFLECTIONS ON
THE MILITARY STRUGGLE FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 155 (1976).
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ately wanted to believe in the myth of the citizen-soldier. Thus, they
enshrined the myth of the militia into their ideology. As historian
Charles Royster notes, "Americans reclaimed the war from the army
to whom they had tried to entrust it" and thus "[t]he future security of
American independence would rest not on a military establishment
but on public virtue. To believe that public virtue had the strength to
sustain independence, Americans wanted to believe that public virtue
had won it."5
Thus, after the Revolution, America wanted to assign the national
defense to the militia. This was necessary because Americans had in
vested so much of their ideological energy in attacking the very idea of
a standing army or a professional army that it was antithetical to the
Revolution now to admit that Independence had been won by profes
sional soldiers. But of course, many Americans who lived through the
war, including such delegates to the Constitutional Convention as
George Washington, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and
General Charles Cotesworth, Pinckney knew better. They knew that a
well-armed standing army, not an incompetent and underarmed mili
tia, was necessary to the security of a free state. In framing the Consti
tution they provided for the development of such an army. The mili
tary provisions of Article I of the U.S. Constitution bear this out.6 To
satisfy the mythmakers and the need for the myth, however, the First
Congress agreed to enshrine the militia, promising not to disarm it, as
long as it was "well regulated" and under the authority of national
government, as set out in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. In
fact, as Bellesiles shows, the Second Amendment's promise not to dis
arm the well-regulated militias was meaningless, because for the most
part the militias had no arms to begin with. As Bellesiles demon
strates, the people, both collectively and as individuals, were basically
unarmed at the time the Bill of Rights was written.
I.

How BELLESILES CLARIFIES WHAT WE ALREADY KNEW

One of the central contributions of this book is that it helps make
sense of American history and, by extension, American constitutional
law. Since almost all scholars have labored under the myths about
guns and the militia, there has always been. a disconnect between what
we knew about history and what we "knew" about guns and the mili
tia.7 A few examples of what almost all educated Americans "know"
5. P. 207 (quoting CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR: THE
CONTINENTAL ARMY AND AMERICAN CHARACTER, 1775-1783, at 351 (1979)).
6. See generally Paul Finkelman, "A Well Regulated Militia ": The Second Amendment in
Historical Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195 (2000).
7. Pp. 10-12 (citing WESLEY FRANK CRAVEN, THE COLONIES IN TRANSITION, 16601713, at 30-31 (1968); WILLIAM C. DAVIS, A WAY THROUGH THE WILDERNESS: THE
NATCHEZ TRACE AND THE CIVILIZATION OF THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER (1995); JOHN M.
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about our history underscore how Bellesiles's findings help us make
sense of things. Essentially, by demythologizing our understanding of
arms, gun ownership, and the militia, Bellesiles allows for a more co
herent understanding of our past.
A. Myth and Reality: Gun- Toting Americans and the Revolution
We "know" that all Americans had guns at the beginning of the
Revolution. They are over the fireplace in every colonial house that
we have seen in the movies and on television.8 But we also know from
historical research that at the beginning of the war Americans were
desperate for guns.
Consider one of the early victories of the war, which demonstrated
both the scarcity of guns among the revolutionaries and the impor
tance to the Continental Army commanders of obtaining guns. On
May 10, 1775, less than a month after the war began, Ethan Allen and
his Green Mountain Boys seized Fort Ticonderoga and its arsenal.
This was a rare victory for civilians acting as soldiers during the
Revolution. These were not even trained militia men, but rather, a
collection of local frontiersmen who swarmed into the Fort. Signifi
cantly, this victory was not won by guns, in part because only twenty of
the eighty-five men with Allen even owned a musket. Allen and his
men seized the fort by surprise, not firepower. His men rushed the
fort, "seized the neatly stacked muskets of the [British] regulars, and
demanded the surrender of the shocked and confused commander,"
who if fact did not even know that "there was a war on" (p. 1 84). The
Green Mountain Boys were now armed. As Bellesiles notes, others in
the colonies soon followed "Allen's example, seizing whatever British
arms and ammunition they could" (p. 185).
Similarly, when we think about Lexington and Concord, we imag
ine the Massachusetts farmers (who were probably the best armed in
America) (pp. 150, 181) rushing out of their homes with muskets in
hand. But the very reason the British were marching to Concord in the
first place was to seize the militia's guns, powder, and shot stored in
the local armory. In other words, the main cache of weapons was not
DEDERER, WAR IN AMERICA TO 1775: BEFORE YANKEE DOODLE 116, 251 (1990); LEE
KENNETT & JAMES LAVERNE ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A
NATIONAL DILEMMA 108 (1995); WARREN MOORE, WEAPONS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, at vi (1967); JAMES B. WHISKER, THE AMERICAN COLONIAL MILITIA 87,
171 (1997); JAMES B. WHISKER, THE GUNSMITH'S TRADE 71, 91 (1992); HAROLD F.
WILLIAMSON, WINCHESTER, THE GUN THAT WON THE WEST 5 (1952); Jenkins, Old Reli
able, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1931; Harold R. Peterson, The Military Equipment of the
Plymouth and Bay Colonies, 1620-1697, NEW ENG. Q., 1947, at 197).
8. It is hard to fathom why these guns are invariably over the fireplace, unless they were
always unloaded and the powder horns hanging with them were empty. It certainly makes no
sense to store a weapon or powder near a fire, which might heat the powder to the point of
combustion, or send a spark that would cause the gun to fire or the powder horn to explode.
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in the farmhouses, but in the central storage house of the local militia.
Many of the farmers that day were armed with edged weapons, par
ticularly axes and hatchets (p. 174).
Similarly, throughout the Revolution the Americans faced con
stant shortages of guns, powder, and bullets. Captured British weap
ons kept the Revolution going until an infusion of French and Dutch
weapons, first sold and then given to the Americans, armed the Continental line.
·

B. Myth and Reality: The Militia and the American Revolution
The myth of the militia was that the armed citizens rushed to the
defense of their lands and families to fight for the patriot cause in the
Revolution. The hardy farmers and frontiersmen were crack shots,
ready to shoot the eyes out of the British. We "know" this was true
because we read it over and over again. Thus, as one historian writing
about Lexington and Concord noted, "[e]very narrative of the fignting
speaks of the superior shooting of the provincials, with the easy as
sumption that as a body they were marksmen" (p. 174). Moreover, as
Bellesiles shows, before the American Revolution many patriot lead
ers bragged about the martial skills of Americans. Richard Henry Lee
claimed that the farmers of western Virginia "could hit an orange at
two hundred yards" and that "[e]very shot is Fatal" (p. 178). Even
James Madison bought into this propaganda effort, asserting that
"[t]he strength of this Colony" was "chiefly in the rifle-men of the
Upland Counties" who could hit "a man's face at the distance of 1 00
Yards" (p. 178). In fact, neither Madison nor Lee had spent much time
with these western marksmen. Had either man visited the frontier he
would have learned that such men did not exist, and that many of the
western men were actually unarmed.A more accurate appraisal of the
situation is made clear by the petition Madison and other members of
Virginia's council received from westerners pleading for aid for their
"raw Militia,'' which was "ill armed, half Clad, ignorant of Discipline,
& of every thing requisite" to the military tasks assigned to them (pp.
178-79).
Bellesiles argues that before, during, and after the Revolution,
Americans had a need to believe in the strength of the militia. It dove
tailed with Republican ideology and with the common hostility to a
standing army. Illustrative of this ideology was the argument of the
anti-Federalist John DeWitt, that "a militia and a standing body of
troops never yet flourished in the same soil,'' and that "Tyrants have
uniformly depended upon the latter, at the expence of the former."9
Similar statements can be found from most of the Founders, although
9. John DeWitt, V: To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1787),
in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 37 (Herbert Storing ed., 1981).
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significantly not from those, like Washington, who had actually seen
the militia in action and realized how ineffective it was in either win
ning independence or defending the nation. Americans wanted to be
lieve that the militia had won the Revolution and could win other
wars. The history we know, and the history Bellesiles now clarifies,
shows how wrong this was.
Consider what we know about the battle of Bunker Hill, which is
usually remembered as an American victory (even though it was not).
In that battle the British suffered about a thousand casualties10 before
the Americans fled from the field because their ammunition ran out.
We "know" that the Americans were so successful at Bunker Hill be
cause they were such great shots. But we also remember the command
of the day: "Don't shoot until you see the whites of their eyes."
Why did they hold their fire until the British were about to overrun
them? In part because they were lousy shots! Americans could hit nei
ther an orange at 200 yards nor the face of an enemy at 100 yards. In
fact, they could only hit the enemy if he was so close they could see his
"the whites of his eyes." Only at point-blank range could these mili
tiamen hit a Redcoat, despite the brilliant target his uniform made.
Even if they had been better shots, however, it would have mat
tered little, because the Americans were so short of ammunition. This
shortage of ammunition and guns helps explain why Americans were
such terrible shots. Marksmanship requires practice and more prac
tice. "In shooting, as in other sports and most other activities, practice
wins out over an imagined innate genius every time. Contrary to one
of the most cherished fictions of American culture, simply living on
the frontier did not make one an excellent shot" (p. 260). Such prac"
tice required an abundance of guns, powder, and shot, which Ameri
cans did not have during the colonial period. Because the Americans
had a shortage of shot and powder, they could not afford to fire volley
after volley as the British charged up the hill (p. 180).
The battle at Lexington and Concord also illustrates the deficien
cies of American martial skill and the paucity of American gun owner
ship. It is true that at the Lexington Green the militia turned out, and
while chased from the field of battle, these farmers and tradesmen
harassed the British from behind trees and stone walls, sending the
Redcoats fleeing back to Boston. The myth tells us that these Ameri
can marksmen, skilled at shooting deer, now did the same to the hated
British lobsterbacks.
If that was so, though, why were so few British troops actually
killed or wounded at Lexington and Concord? At least 3,763 Ameri
cans "are known to have participated in this long day of battle" (p.
174). At most the British had about 900 men in the field. Hopelessly
10. SHY, supra note 4, at 103.
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outnumbered, the British ultimately ran back to Boston, suffering
seventy-three dead, 174 wounded, and twenty-six missing.11 This
means that the more than 3,700 American militiamen managed to hit
their targets - British soldiers - no more than 273 times.12 But even
this figure is too high, because we know that some of the British sol
diers were killed or wounded by axes, hatchets, knives, and swords weapons that were more common than guns, and tools that Americans
did know how to wield.
So how could it be that so many Americans failed to do more
damage to the fleeing British troops? How could these American
marksmen, skilled at killing deer and Indians, at home in the woods,
almost born with musket in their hands, miss so often?
The answer, as Bellesiles demonstrates, is twofold. First, many of
these militiamen showed up at Lexington with axes, knives, and
swords because they did not own guns. And those who did own guns
brought for the most part rusty muskets, not more accurate rifles. And
even if they had access to state-of-the-art weapons, they had little skill
in using them. They were not hunters, Indian fighters, or marksmen.
They were farmers, tradesmen, blacksmiths, teachers, and ministers
roused to action by a silversmith. As one of the first historians to chip
away at the myth of the American militia noted: "Every narrative of
the fighting . . . speaks of the superior shooting of the provincials, with
the easy assumption that as a body they were marksmen," but in real
ity, "marksmen they were not."1 3
Nor, as the war continued, was it clear that they were "superior" to
the British as soldiers. In the second year of the war the great pam
phleteer Tom Paine complained that these were "the times that try
men's souls," because the "summer patriots" had all gone home.14 In
deed, throughout the War, the militia had a terribly annoying habit of
simply disappearing, often before a battle or in the middle of the bat
tle. As John Shy, who is sympathetic to the militia, noted some years
ago, "militiamen would not automatically spring to arms in time of
danger. They were afraid. They lacked the confidence that comes with
training and experience."15 Bellesiles now shows us that they also
lacked arms and ammunition. Indeed, throughout the war, the militia
was unreliable and often useless. More than a few patriot soldiers
needlessly lost their lives because the militia abandoned the battlefield
and left the Continental line unprotected and undermanned. General
11. ROBERT A. GROSS, THE MINUTEMEN AND THEIR WORLD 130 (1976).
12. This assumes the "missing" were wounded or killed by gunfire.
13. ALLEN FRENCH, THE DAY OF CONCORD AND LEXINGTON: THE NINETEENTH OF
APRIL, 1775, at 27 (1925).
14. TOM PAINE, THE AMERICAN CRISIS 1 (1776), reprinted in COMMON SENSE AND
RELATED WRITINGS 126 (Thomas P. Slaughter ed., 2001).
15. SHY, supra note 4, at 151.
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Nathaniel Greene complained that the militia "have refused to turn
out when there has been the greatest want of their Assistance" (p.
195). At the battle of Camden the militia fled in terror, leading to the
death of General DeKalb and a major American defeat.16 Thus,
Richard Henry Lee's assurances to his brother that western Virginia
would send 6000 "Rifle Men that for their number make [the) most
formidable light Infantry in the World" were unfounded (p. 178). As
Bellesiles wryly notes, "[f)or some reason these six thousand marks
men did not materialize during the war" (p. 178).
Propaganda is always important in war, and at times both the
Americans and British believed the patriot bravado. For most of the
war, however, the cognoscente knew perfectly well that the militia was
often useless. Washington's disdain for the militia is notorious. As
early as 1757 he complained that in the Virginia militia, "[m]any of
them [were] unarmed, and all [were] without ammunition or provi
sion."17 He considered the militia "incapacitated to defend themselves,
must less to annoy the enemy."18 In 1776 he "damned the militia and
called on Congress for a professional army of long-service volun
teers."19 In that year he privately complained "that no Dependence
can be put on the Militia for a continuance in Camp, or Regularity and
Discipline during the short time they may stay."20 By 1780 he had
abandoned all hope of "carrying on a War with Militia."21 He con
demned those who "extolled" the militia as "visionary Men whose
credulity easily swallowed every vague story in support of a favorite
Hypothesis," and declared he had never seen an example of the Mili
tia "being fit for the real business of fighting" (p. 194). In one
Maryland brigade, twenty-six percent of the men lacked weapons,
while in a New York unit sixty-three percent were unarmed (p. 200).
As a general and as President, he wanted a standing Army to defend
the young nation (p. 218).
Much of this history is well known to military historians. But, with
the addition of Bellesiles's work, we can now better understand why
the received story of an armed people has never fit well with the real-

16. P. 196. ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, 1763-1789, at 456-57 (1982).
17. P. 159 (quoting Letter from George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie (June 27,
1757), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 77, 78-79 (C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931)).
18. P. 159 (quoting Letter from George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie (June 27,
1757), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 77, 79 (C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931)).
19. SHY, supra note 4, at 151.
20. P. 194 (quoting Letter from George Washington to John Hancock (July 10, 1775), in
2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 327 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1983)).
21. Id.; p. 194 (quoting George Washington, Circular to the States (October 18, 1780),
reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 77, 78-79 (C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
1931)).
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ity of an incompetent and unarmed militia. The people simply were
never armed or skilled with firearms.
C.

Myth and Reality: Guns in the Early Republic

After the Revolution, Americans were no more skilled with fire
arms than before, and they were just as unlikely to own any. Gunmak
ers were rarer than gunsmiths. Bellesiles' studies of newspapers show
no gunmakers or gunsmiths advertising in the newspapers in
Maryland, South Carolina, or Philadelphia between 1786 and 1800 (p.
229). Between 1777 and 1799 only nine gunsmiths advertised in New
York City's newspapers (p. 228). It may be that the studies on which
Bellesiles relies are off by a gunsmith here and there. But the conclu
sion seems overwhelming: guns were simply not very important to
most Americans. Expensive, complicated, and difficult to maintain,
they were the playthings of the rich and well born, just as hunting was
usually the sport of the elite, who had the time to waste tramping
through the forest looking for game.
A quick look at the various early federal statutes on militias, most
of which Bellesiles discusses, reveals again how his insights are con
firmed by other forms of evidence. What we "know" about the federal
militia acts now makes sense, because Bellesiles has filled in the in
formation on the shortage of guns in America.
Under the Militia Act of 179222 the federal government expected
militia men to arm themselves. As Bellesiles notes, however, "nothing
of this sort happened" (p. 262). Thus, a few years later, Congress re
sponded with the Militia Acts of 179423 and 1797,24 which required the
state governors to "arm and equip according to law" the state militias.
It is not clear if the "according to law" referred back to the 1792 stat
ute, or if this now meant that the states were to arm the militias. Any
confusion was cleared in 1798, when Congress passed "An Act pro
viding Arms for the Militia throughout the United States."25 As the ti
tle suggests, Congress had given up on the people providing their own
arms. Thus, Congress declared that the United States would provide
"thirty thousand stand of arms" to "be sold to the governments of the
respective States, or the militia thereof."26
With a possible war against France looming on the horizon, the
United States could no longer live with the mythology of an armed

22. "An Act more effectually to provide for the National Defence . . . . " Act of May 8,
1792, 1 Stat. 271.
23. Act of May 9, 1794, 1 Stat. 367.
24. Act of June 24, 1797, 1 Stat. 522.
25. Act of July 6, 1798, 1 Stat. 576.
26. Id.
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populace. The reality was that the people owned few guns, and many
of them were old, rusted, and in disrepair. No war with France took
place, but when the Jeffersonians came to power they discovered the
nation's defenses were weak. In 1803, Secretary of War Henry
Dearborn authorized a national census of arms and weapons.
"Dearborn discovered that [only] 45 percent of the militia bore arms,''
and that less than a quarter of the nation's white male population (less
than five percent of the total population) owned a gun (pp. 262-63).
Such figures illustrated the need for the Militia Act of 1803, which de
clared that "every citizen duly enrolled in the militia shall be con
stantly provided with arms, accoutrements, and ammunition."27
This Act, as well as the earlier Act of 1798, was consistent with the
obligations of Congress to "provide for organizing, arming, and disci
plining the Militia."28 But, until this time Congress had failed to fulfill
the Constitution's command. There seem to be three complementary
explanations for the failure of Congress to act up until this time. First,
there may have been an economic concern - lack of funds to supply
the militias. This was tied to the second reason - lack of guns in the
country. Guns were scarce, and therefore expensive. Congress could
not supply the militia, because there were few guns to distribute. In
deed, during this period Congress was buying guns, as well as gun
locks and steel for the domestic production of weapons, from England
(p. 232). Finally, in 1792, the leaders of Congress may have been suf
fering from the effects of the revolutionary-era propaganda that the
American people were well armed. In any event, by 1798 Congress re
alized that if the militia was to be armed, the national government
would have to supply the arms.
The question, of course, was where the government would find
these arms. Imports supplied some of the requirements, but a domes
tic arms industry was the real answer. In his famous Report on the

27. "An Act in addition to an act entitled, 'An act more effectually to provide for the
National defence . . . .' " Act of Mar. 2, 1803, 2 Stat. 207. At page 230 Bellesiles mistakenly
asserts that this provision of the 1803 act was part of the 1792 act. My guess is that his confu
sion resulted from either looking at a compilation of statutes which combined the two, or by
looking at various reenactments of the militia law in 1813 and 1814, see p. 521 n.85. He may
have also carelessly used an early compilation, THE MILITIA LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
AND MASSACHUSETTS (1836), which was anonymously published in Boston, rather than
looking at the United States Statutes at Large. This suggests the complexity of doing legal re
search from this period - or simply some sloppy note-taking - but does not indicate any
attempt by Bellesiles to misrepresent the facts to support his thesis. In fact, as I argue in this
section of the Review, the correct story provides even greater support for Bellesiles's overall
argument: that the Congress bought the myth of an armed populace in 1792, and starting in
1798 began to abandon that idea. By 1803, only eleven years after the first Militia Act,
Congress had completely rejected the foolish notion of relying on the members of the militia
to bring their own arms with them. They had no arms to bring, and Congress finally admitted
this.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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Subject of Manufactures29 Alexander Hamilton had urged support for
gun manufacturing and gunpowder as a national necessity. 30 Despite
his support for private enterprise, Hamilton suggested that "necessary
weapons of war" might be manufactured by the government itself. 31
He similarly urged the stimulation of lead manufacturing, 3 2 and he was
ready to exempt both saltpeter and sulfur from import duties because
they were necessary for the creation of a domestic gunpowder indus
try, and the United States had no domestic supply. 3 3
Beginning in 1795, the national government followed Hamilton's
advice and tried to stimulate gun production in America. But this at
tempted stimulation failed. For instance, after the Revolution,
Congress armed soldiers by purchasing seven thousand muskets from
England (p. 232). This practice of buying guns and, more importantly,
gunlocks from Great Britain continued until the War of 1812 inter
rupted the flow. Attempts by American entrepreneurs did nothing to
stimulate a domestic supply of weapons. In 1795, Eli Whitney won a
contract to produce weapons for the country. Despite the myth of
Whitney inventing interchangeable parts, Bellesiles demonstrates that
the inventor of the cotton gin produced almost no usable weapons for
his country (pp. 233-35). The United States government did manage to
develop a few factories of its own that produced weapons at national
armories in Springfield, Massachusetts, and Harpers Ferry, Virginia
(now West Virginia), but the numbers were small. Between 1795 and
1799, Springfield produced only 7,750 muskets - about a third of
what was needed (p. 238). In the Civil War this armory would be es
sential to the national defense, but in the War of 1812 it was only mar
ginally valuable.
The conclusion from statutes, production records, various gun cen
suses, government reports, and newspaper records is overwhelming:
After the Revolution, Americans had few guns and could produce few
guns. The people, with some exceptions, were relatively unarmed.

D. Myth and Reality: The Militia and the War of 1812, or Who Really
Saved New Orleans?
During the War of 1812, the militias were for the most part useless,
and often unarmed. Fewer than 4,500 British soldiers captured and
burned Washington, D.C., despite the presence of "some fifty thou29. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Report on the Subject of Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791), in
10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230 (Harold c. Syrett et al. eds., 1966).
30. Id. at 317, 334.
31. Id. at 317.
32. Id. at 319.
33. Id. at 334.

1512

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 99:1500

sand militia within a day's march of the capital" (p. 254). Those few
that did show up to defend the nation's capital lacked guns, flints, and
leadership. One militia regiment came to Washington "wholly un
armed," and thus was of little use in defending the city (p. 255). This
shortage was not unique to the region around the national capital.
Counting all guns in private hands and in public armories, regardless
of their age or condition, New York had only enough weapons for half
of its militiamen, and Virginia could only arm twenty-three percent of
its militia (p. 255). The same situation arose in the West. Over 2,300
Kentucky militiamen showed up at New Orleans to serve under
Andrew Jackson, but only 700 of them had guns, and Jackson com
plained that "the arms they have are not fit for use" (p. 259).
After the Battle of New Orleans, Americans created myths and
songs about the "Hunters of Kentucky" who won the battle with their
marksmanship. In reality, however, these mostly unarmed frontiers
men were farmers who had few skills with a musket. Cannon "manned
by members of the U.S. Navy and Army," as well as by Jean Lafite's
pirates, won the battle, along with some regular soldiers armed by the
national government (p. 259). But as Bellesiles notes, "the myth of the
Kentucky riflemen picking which eye of British officers to shoot out
fulfilled some deep national yearning. An imagined American equality
seemed to demand that every man could be the equal of the best
trained troops in the world - at least in popular songs and tall tales"
(p. 259).
E. Myth and Reality: Bleeding Kansas and Guns in Antebellum
America
Bellesiles argues, correctly I believe, that the "arming of America"
began to take shape after the Mexican-American War (1846-47) and
that it continued to accelerate until the Civil War. This appears to be
true, but the evidence from Kansas shows that this process of arming
America was incomplete, and rather slow, as late as the 1850s.
Bellesiles only briefly mentions the events in Kansas - the scene of
America's warm up for the Civil War - in the mid-1850s. He notes,
for example, that members of the Connecticut Kansas Colony, setting
out for what was already "Bleeding Kansas" in 1856, were given fifty
rifles by their supporters and friends in state (p. 370). Bellesiles uses
this information to illustrate the acceleration of the arming of America
immediately before the Civil War. The fact that these settlers had to
be given weapons en route to a hostile environment, however, sug
gests that many people in America as late as the 1850s did not own
guns. Moreover, Kansas was not as well armed as even Bellesiles as
sumes. Furthermore, if the settlers did have any guns, few in Kansas
actually knew how to use them. Bellesiles notes that two free-state
men were captured by proslavery forces because, while they had four
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guns with them, they had no firing caps, and thus the guns were useless
(p. 370). The free-state military leader James Montgomery urged that
volunteers be trained in the use and care of weapons before they ar
rived in the territory (p. 370).
What little Bellesiles says about Kansas dovetails with the larger
story in the territory. Moreover, Bellesiles's overall thesis helps ex
plain the nature of the early struggle in Kansas.
After the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, free-state
settlers swarmed into the territory and quickly became involved in a
mini-Civil War, fighting settlers from the slave states. Many - per
haps most - of the settlers came not for politics, but for fresh, inex
pensive land. Even the most famous family to move to Kansas, the
Browns of Ohio, came for land and a fresh start in life. Like so many
other Northerners, the Browns thought keeping Kansas a free state
could be done with the ballot box, or with moral suasion. They did not
come to fight. But, very quickly, they found themselves in an armed
conflict. 3 4
The patriarch of the family, John Brown, remained in Ohio while
his sons went to the new territory. In May 1855, a fearful Salmon
Brown wrote his father: "There is a great lack of arms here . . . ." 3 5
Similarly, John Brown, Jr., wrote his father that the antislavery men
were "desperately short of guns." 36 John Jr. begged his father to find
some wealthy supporters of the cause to buy guns. "Give us the arms,
and we are ready for the contest."37 At the moment they had only a
few Sharps rifles sent by some eastern abolitionists. Thus it was that in
the summer of 1855 John Brown toured the East and Midwest, raising
money to buy Colt revolvers, Sharps rifles, powder, caps, and swords. 38
In October 1 855, John Brown arrived in Kansas with "revolvers, rifles,
dirk knives, and those menacing broadswords." 39 Meanwhile other
boxes of rifles, sometimes known as a "Beecher's Bibles,"40 arrived in
the free-state settlements of Kansas. The industrialist Amos Lawrence
helped pay for about 325 Sharps rifles that were sent to free-state set
tlers in Kansas.4 1

34. STEPHEN B . OATES, TO PURGE THIS LAND WITH BLOOD: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN
BROWN 90-93 (2d ed. 1984).
35. Id. at 88.
36. Id. at 90.
37. Id. at 92.
38. Id. at 92-93.
39. Id. at 98.
40. Named after the fervent abolitionist the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher.
41. DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861, at 206-07 (Don E.
Fehnrenbacher ed., 1976).
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Why did John Brown have to bring guns to his sons in Kansas?
Why didn't they bring their own? Why were the Connecticut Kansas
settlers Bellesiles writes about have to be given guns when they left
(pp. 370-71)? Although I have long taught and even written about
Brown, 42 only after reading Bellesiles do I understand the answers to
these questions. As Bellesiles repeatedly demonstrates, most Ameri
can men in the mid-nineteenth century did not own a gun and could
not afford the luxury of buying one. Thus, the settlers who went to
Kansas to make it a free state did so without guns, or, if they took
guns, like the Connecticut Kansas Colony settlers, they took them be
cause "without any agency of our own, we were presented with fifty
Rifles, which we gladly accepted" (p. 370).
F. Myth and Reality: Where Were A ll Those Guns When the Civil
War Began?
A final example of how Bellesiles's book helps explain American
history concerns the American Civil War.The myth of America is that
all white men, especially in the South, were heavily armed. We all
"know" this. But we also well know that, with just under 160,000 guns,
the Confederacy was desperately short of arms when the war began.
The Confederacy did everything it could to import them from Europe,
but Lincoln's blockade effectually stopped these imports by 1863. The
would-be nation failed to produce many guns of its own, and through
out the war the Confederacy survived with weapons captured from the
enemy, taken from dead United States soldiers, or sneaked past the
blockade (p. 419). A few European guns made it to the Confederacy
through Mexico.
If the myth of a gun-owning America had been true, these short
ages would not have been so great. Moreover, with over four million
slaves in 1860, the region was a tinderbox waiting to explode, and only
the vigilance of the master class prevented this.The South should have
been well armed because of the apparent need of the master class for
arms, the presumption that rural men were all gun owners, and the
cultural presupposition that the South was more gun happy than the
North. But the South was not well armed because, as Bellesiles
teaches us, guns were expensive, complicated, and, until the Civil War,
manufactured in small numbers in the nation.

42. HIS SOUL GOES MARCHING ON: RESPONSES TO JOHN BROWN AND THE HARPERS
FERRY RAID (Paul Finkelman ed., 1976).
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II. THE MILITIA, THE MYTH OF AN ARMED POPULACE, AND THE
SECOND AMENDMENT

Throughout much of our history, the militia has been held in con
tempt, despite the fact that we have simultaneously created a myth
about the success of the militia in battle and its role in both creating
the nation in 1776-83 and defending it afterwards. The contradiction
was of course a function of the ideology of the Revolution which con
demned the professional, or "standing" Army, which became a proxy
for everything that was wrong with the British Empire, and thus
forced the revolutionaries to praise the militia. Thus, on the eve of the
Revolution John Hancock noted that "[f]rom a well regulated militia
we have nothing to fear," but he asked rhetorically, from a standing
army "what has not a state to fear?"4 3 Of course, during the Revolu
tion Americans learned just how ineffective the militia was, but the
ideological commitment against a standing army forced Americans to
enshrine the militia in popular myth.
This cultural admiration for the militia also led to the adoption of
what became the Second Amendment. Anti-Federalists, fearful of a
strong national government, were particularly concerned about the re
ality of a professional army, which Congress was clearly empowered to
create under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. In writing the Bill
of Rights, Madison did nothing to undermine national power, 4 4 but he
was willing to offer up a promise that each state would be able to
maintain a "well regulated militia," subject, of course to federal call
up, as set out in Article I, Section 8.
While the myth of the militia seemed important to Americans after
the Revolution, the reality of the militia, both during and after the
Revolution was another matter. And so, from the end of the Revolu
tion to the Civil War the militia was generally held in contempt. We
know (or at least we have long thought we knew)45 that the militia
would parade annually or even twice a year, have its musters, and that
usually the most important aspect of the muster was the keg of hard
cider, or some other strong beverage. The militia was something of a
joke from the colonial period to the Revolution to the Civil War. In
43. JOHN PHILLIP REID, IN DEFIANCE OF LAW: THE STANDING-ARMY CONTROVERSY,
THE Two CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 104 (1981).
44. Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Adoption of the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant
Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301-47 (1991).
45. One of the many things this book teaches us is that some states actually abolished
their militias in the early and mid-nineteenth centuries, and that no states actually required
people to serve. In 1811, for example, Delaware "essentially eliminated its militia." P. 387.
When Lincoln asked the loyal state governors to call out their militias, "Governor William
Burton of Delaware, informed Lincoln that their militia did not actually exist." P. 410. Simi
larly, in Lincoln's home county of Sangamon, Illinois, people "were rudely reminded that
they did not have a militia, and had not for the previous fifteen years." Pp. 409-10.
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the eighteenth century, most militias "bee[a]me more social than mili
tary organizations. " 46 The growth of private militias in the nineteenth
century continued this process. The more social they became, the less
likely the militias were to be serious military organizations. In the
nineteenth century, the private militias were better dressed, often in
snappy, brightly colored uniforms. They were social clubs, often, but
not always, for the elite. When the Civil War began, the militias on
both sides were barely competent and not much good in battle. Slowly,
painfully, and at great expense of hunian life, American boys on both
sides of the Mason-Dixon line learned to be soldiers.
Indeed, the whole notion of the citizen-soldier from the colonial
period to the Revolution appears largely to have been a myth. In co
lonial New York, commercial connections, not the militia, kept the
peace with the Iroquois. And as the University of Michigan's great
military historian John Shy noted, "in time of trouble," New York
"had to call for help." 47 In Virginia, the militia "virtually ceased to ex
ist" in the half century after Bacon's Rebellion of 1676, 48 and the col
ony relied for defense on Rangers - "a few dozen paid, mounted sol
diers who 'ranged' " along the frontier from fort to fort. 49 In 1713,
"[w]hen the Tuscarora momentarily menaced Virginia,"50 the gover
nor tried to call out the militia, but no one turned out. Thus, the gov
ernor, "convinced that he could not make war, made peace." 5 1 The
same story could be told, as Bellesiles does, for most of the colonial
militias. As we have seen, during the Revolution General Washington
and others had nothing but contempt for the militia. Washington felt
the same way when he was a colonel during the Seven Years War. In
the War of 1812, the militias were almost nowhere to be seen and not
terribly useful when they were around.52
As Bellesiles notes, the militia was critical to the nation's psyche as
a symbol of republican virtue. Americans at the time of the Revolu
tion believed a standing army was dangerous, even though it was the
professional army that, battling for eight years, fought the British to a
standstill and forced the strongest nation in the world to the peace ta
ble.
The Constitution of 1787 reflected the reality of the recent past.
Article I provided for the establishment of a military by the national
government. The militia would exist but would be always subject to
46. SHY, supra note 4, at 29.
47. Id. at 27.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 25.
50. Id.
51. /d. at 27.
52. Pp. 159-60, 254-55; supra text accompanying note 5.
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federal regulation and control. This frightened some Americans, who
feared a professional standing army and believed that the strength of
the nation was in the militia.5 3
Men like Washington, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Henry Knox,
and even James Madison understood how absurd this was. They knew
that the professional army, trained by Washington and a host of Euro
pean officers, had won the war. Furthermore, former generals like
Washington, Pinckney, and Knox also understood that the nation had
nothing to fear from the military. Good republicans all, they trusted
the officers and men under their command to support the Constitu
tion.
When he introduced what became the Bill of Rights, Madison did
not accept the fears of the Anti-Federalists or others who asked for
amendments. He thought a bill of rights was utterly unnecessary,5 4 but
Madison was willing to concede "that in a certain form and to a certain
extent," a bill of rights "was neither improper nor altogether use
less."55 While proposing amendments that were neither "improper"
nor "useless," Madison was careful, as he noted in a private letter to
Edmund Randolph, to make sure that "[t)he structure & stamina of
the Govt. are as little touched as possible."56 It is this goal of Madison
- to protect the "structure & stamina" of the new government - that
most illuminates the meaning of the Second Amendment. Bellesiles's
important book, however, adds significant social, economic, and mili
tary history background to how we understand the Founding in gen
eral, and the Second Amendment in particular.
Madison generally saw the Bill of Rights as clarifying the meaning
of the Constitution, not fundamentally changing it. He had no prob
lem expressly protecting freedom of religion, for example, because he
did not think that the purpose of the Constitution was to allow
Congress to regulate religion, even where Congress had plenary juris
diction. Similarly, he was willing explicitly to protect the right of a jury
trial in federal prosecutions, since he believed the Constitution already
protected that right. He probably had not thought much about the
right to counsel, but he saw no impediment to protecting it.
He was not, however, ready to undermine the "structure & stam
ina" of the new government.Thus, he did not dismantle the provision
allowing Congress to create an army or to regulate the state militias.
·

53. Letter of Edmund Randolph, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 88 (Herbert
Storing ed., 1981); Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 375 (Herbert
Storing ed., 1981 ).
54. Paul Finkelman, supra note 44, at 302-03.
55. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 453 (1st Cong., 1st Sess.) (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds.,
1789).
56. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15, 1789), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 219 (Charles F. Hobson et. al. eds., 1979).
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He certainly had no interest in protecting a personal right to own guns,
because, as Bellesiles demonstrates, few people had guns anyway, and
those who did included malcontents, such as the farmers who gathered
in Shay's Rebellion. Madison probably did not believe in the myth of
the militia, either. He knew better. But he was happy to promise that
the new national government would not dismantle or disarm the state
militias, as long as they remained "well regulated," which meant under
federal supervision as Article I required. Since some people feared the
new national government might dismantle the state militias, 57 Madison
was willing to put a provision in the Bill of Rights explicitly stating
that Congress would not disarm the state militias. At the same time,
he had no interest in preventing Congress from regulating weapons in
the places where Congress had clear legislative power.58 Madison had
worked for a strong government - with a national army and the
power to federalize state militias - at the Philadelphia Convention.
He had no interest in undermining this in the Bill of Rights by prohib
iting a standing army, removing the power of the national government
to control the state militias, or permitting citizens to have unfettered
access to weapons.
A rming America gives us a context for understanding what the
First Congress did when it wrote what became the Second Amend
ment. Bellesiles demonstrates, over and over again, decade by decade,
that until the Civil War era most Americans had little interest in guns
or gun ownership. Even in the debates over the Constitution, the fears
of the Anti-Federalists were not about losing their guns - because
they mostly did not have any - but about creating a standing army.
The Anti-Federalists59 worried that the standing army would take
over. Madison answered that the best defense against this was a well
regulated state militia, armed by the national government. That was
the plan set out in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The Second
Amendment merely reaffirmed this plan, and at the same time guaran
teed that if the national government did not arm the militias (as the
Constitution obligated it to do), the states could do so themselves.
A rming America is clearly controversial. Supporters of an individ
ual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment - what some

57. Washington was willing to do this, as was Secretary of War Henry Knox. Senator
Rufus King of Massachusetts opposed arming the militia on the frontier, "least they should
Use them against the United States." THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND. OTHER
NOTES ON SENATE DEBATES 246 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988).
58. For a greater discussion of this, see Finkelman, supra note 6.
59. See generally Paul Finkelman, Turning Losers into Winners: What Can We Learn, If
Anything, from the Antifederalists?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 849 (2001) (reviewing SAUL CORNELL,
THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN
AMERICA 1788-1828 (1999)).
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proponents arrogantly call "the standard model" interpretation60 are clearly threatened by this book. If it is true that gun ownership was
irrelevant to most Americans, then it is hard to believe they would
have fought to amend the Constitution to protect the right to own
something they could not own and did not want to own. And as Don
Higginbotham, a leading military historian, has noted, "[i]n all the dis
cussions and debates from the Revolution to the eve of the Civil War,
there is precious little evidence that advocates of local control of the
militia showed an equal or even secondary concern for gun ownership
as a personal right."61
Some activists have taken it upon themselves to check every foot
note and source in the book. They flood various listservs with errors
they have found. Doubtless they will find some in a book if over 600
pages, almost 150 of which are densely packed footnotes. Serious
scholars have questioned some of Bellesiles's use of probate records
and his statistical analysis of them in determining gun ownership. It is
likely that those numbers will change as other scholars examine the
evidence.
On the other hand, the simple statistics on weapons production
and importation, and the various gun censuses taken by state and fed
eral officials, support the conclusion that gun ownership was not all
that common in this period. Moreover, the thesis presented here
seems overwhelmingly solid. The nonstatistical evidence from letters,
diaries, official reports, and statutes all point in the same direction:
from the colonial period to the Civil War guns were expensive, com
plicated, and not widely owned, and most Americans were not par
ticularly skilled at using them: When we fought Britain, and when we
wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
including the Second
Amendment - we were not a gun culture. These conclusions must in
form us today as we debate public policy and constitutional law sur
rounding an America that is now fully armed.
�

60. For a discussion of this "model," see Saul Cornell, Commonplace of Anachronism:
The Standard Model, the Second Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary
Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 221 (1999), and Symposium on the Second
Amendment: Fresh Looks, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (2000).
61. P. 215 (quoting Don Higginbotham, The Federalized Militia Debate: A Neglected
Aspect ofSecond Amendment Scholarship, 55 WM. & MARY Q. (3rd ser.) 39, 40 (1998)).

